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October 25, 1967
The Member's complaint is a grievance and not a question of privilege. The remarks of the Bank chairman "relate more particularly to the Government than to the personal conduct of Members in the...
The Speaker denied a question of privilege, ruling that a complaint about a Bank chairman's remarks was a political grievance against the government, not an impediment to Members' duties.
October 18, 1967
In the first case, there is obviously a divergence of opinion "and the matter should be allowed to rest there for the time being". With respect to the second case, the alleged comments made about...
The Speaker denies a question of privilege, ruling that a disagreement and alleged comments were not libellous.
October 24, 1966
In such an instance as this, it is not necessary for the Speaker to decide if a breach of privilege has been committed, but to decide if the complaint was raised at the earliest opportunity, and...
The Speaker ruled that a prima facie question of privilege regarding reflections on a Member was established and allowed the corresponding motion to proceed.
October 18, 1966
The Chair must rule on two points in the case. First, the motion goes beyond the scope of the limited question of privilege raised by Mr. Nugent and revives a point concerning the fact of the...
The Chair denied a question of privilege, ruling the motion was improperly substantive and the minister's words did not meet the prima facie threshold for a breach.
October 13, 1966
The rules do not contemplate the possibility of a second interpretation on a decision of the Chair on a question of privilege. The Member had originally asked for a ruling on a question of...
The Speaker denies a request for a second ruling, clarifying that Chair's decisions are final and complaints about words are typically points of order, not questions of privilege.
May 10, 1966
In order to constitute a breach of privilege, the libel must be based on matters arising from the actual transaction of the business of the House. Since this is not the case in this situation,...
The Speaker denied a question of privilege because the alleged libel did not relate to House business and was not raised at the earliest opportunity.
March 11, 1966
Despite the fact that the Chair has declared there is a prima facie case of privilege, none of the three motions is in order. "... the motions assume as a conclusion that an actual breach of...
The Speaker ruled that motions following a prima facie privilege finding must refer the matter to a committee and cannot be substantive motions that presume guilt.
June 30, 1943
Indication had been given that arguments would be made, and notice confirming that indication had been received by the Speaker's office. It is unreasonable to maintain that despite the interval...
The Speaker ruled that a Member's words constituted an unparliamentary direct charge against another Member, violating Standing Order 35.