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March 10, 1972
Any accusation made against a senior public official is a breach of order. [In this case, the official is the Auditor General who, in failing to submit his annual report to the House as stipulated...
The Speaker denied a question of privilege, ruling that accusations against the Auditor General are matters of order or administration to be addressed by a substantive motion.
November 28, 1967
"If there really was a question of privilege it should be followed by a motion", but none was moved. In addition, "a question of privilege must be raised at the first opportunity. That does not...
A question of privilege was denied for not being raised at the first opportunity and for lacking a required motion.
May 10, 1966
In order to constitute a breach of privilege, the libel must be based on matters arising from the actual transaction of the business of the House. Since this is not the case in this situation,...
The Speaker denied a question of privilege because the alleged libel did not relate to House business and was not raised at the earliest opportunity.
March 11, 1966
Despite the fact that the Chair has declared there is a prima facie case of privilege, none of the three motions is in order. "... the motions assume as a conclusion that an actual breach of...
The Speaker ruled that motions following a prima facie privilege finding must refer the matter to a committee and cannot be substantive motions that presume guilt.